Game theoretic power aware wireless data access by Kwok, YK & Yeung, KH
Title Game theoretic power aware wireless data access
Author(s) Yeung, KH; Kwok, YK
Citation
The 6th IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless
Mobile and Multimedia Networks, Taormina, Giardini, Naxos, 13-
16 June 2005, p. 324-329
Issued Date 2005
URL http://hdl.handle.net/10722/45818
Rights
©2005 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. However,
permission to reprint/republish this material for advertising or
promotional purposes or for creating new collective works for
resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or to reuse any
copyrighted component of this work in other works must be
obtained from the IEEE.
Game Theoretic Power Aware
Wireless Data Access
Mark Kai Ho Yeung and Yu-Kwong Kwok
Department of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
The University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong
Email: {khyeung,ykwok}@eee.hku.hk
Abstract—This paper examines the following wireless data ac-
cess scenario: a number of clients are interested in a set of data
items kept at the server. A client sends a query request to in-
form the server of its desired data item. The server replies in the
common broadcast channel. We first define a utility function that
considers client’s power consumption in transmit, receive and idle
modes. Specifically, utility is expressed as the number of queries
that can be completed given a fixed energy source. Based on the
utility function, we formulate our power aware wireless data ac-
cess scheme as a non-cooperative game, called the WDA game.
From our theoretical analysis, we show that clients are not always
necessary to send query requests to the server. Instead, each client
determines the request probability without any explicit communi-
cation with one another. Furthermore, we design and evaluate the
server and client algorithms for the WDA game. Simulation re-
sults confirm that our proposed scheme, comparing with a simple
always-request one, increases the utility and lifetime of every client
while reducing the number of requests sent, at the cost of a slightly
larger average query delay.
Index Terms—Wireless Data Access, Game theory, Economics,
Simulations.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the popularity of personal area networks (PANs),
such as 802.11x and Bluetooth, there has been increasingly
large amount of information being delivered over the wireless
medium. Furthermore, the world-wide deployment of third
generation (3G) cellular systems is going to complement the
coverage limitations in PANs. 3G, together with PANs, makes
ubiquitous information access a reality [13]. Recently, network
operators have started offering real-time video services in 3G
[9]. In addition to voice and video traffic sources, it is expected
to have more and more data applications being deployed in the
near future. One fundamental support to many interesting ap-
plications is to provide efficient on-demand information access,
which enables mobile clients to selectively “pull” the desired
data from the server.
On-demand information access has recently attracted much
attention. In particular, researchers have proposed different
techniques to conserve clients’ energy. For example, the wire-
less broadcast channel has been widely used in data dissemina-
tion [1], [5], [14], [17]. The amount of broadcast traffic does
not depend on client population size. Datta et al. [7] presented
a comprehensive energy consumption model to study a set of
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broadcast protocols for data retrieval. We have also done some
work in this area [14], [15]. However, most previous work fo-
cus on the design of different cache invalidation schemes. To
maintain cache consistency, each client is required to retrieve
periodic invalidation information indefinitely. This may not be
desirable for clients with low request rates or data items with
frequent updates.
To avoid the above drawback, we utilize the broadcast chan-
nel from another perceptive. Specifically, we consider the fol-
lowing scenario: a number of clients are interested in a set of
data items kept at the server. Each client sends a request to in-
form the server of its desired data item. The server replies in the
common broadcast channel periodically. There is no need for
clients to maintain consistency. To quantify power consumption
in the query process, we consider that clients dissipate energy in
transmit, receive and idle modes. We formulate the distributed
client power conservation problem with game theory, which has
become an increasingly popular tool in modeling different net-
working problems [4].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the details of system model; energy consump-
tion model; and the formal problem statement. Furthermore,
we analyze the performance of our proposed power aware data
access scheme . Simulation results are presented and discussed
in Section III. Finally, we draw some concluding remarks in
Section IV.
II. PROPOSED POWER AWARE WIRELESS DATA ACCESS
GAME
A. Problem Formulation
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Fig. 1. System model for wireless data access.
Figure 1 depicts the system model for wireless data access.
It consists of a server and a set of clients, N . The clients are
interested in a common set of data items, D, which are kept at
the server. To request a specific data item, da, client i is required
to inform the server by sending an uplink request, represented
by qi(da). The server replies with the content of the requested
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data item, da, in the common broadcast channel. This allows
the broadcast data item to be shared among different clients. As
illustrated in Figure 1, both clients j and k request the same data
item, dc, in the second interval. However, server is required
to broadcast the content of dc only once in the next broadcast
period. In this paper, we investigate the energy consumption
characteristics of the above data access model. Specifically, we
are interested in conserving the energy consumed among the
clients.
To successfully complete a query, a client expends its energy
in two different parts: (1) informing the server of the desired
data item, EUL; and (2) downloading the content of the data
item from the common broadcast channel, EDL. The energy
cost of sending a request to the server is represented by Es.
Note that EUL does not necessarily equal Es (see Section II-
A). It is assumed that EDL is proportional to the size of a data
item. In practice, Es is a function of various quantities [12],
including spatial separation, speed, instantaneous channel qual-
ity, bit-error rate requirement, etc. For simplicity, however, Es
is also assumed to be a fixed quantity, except in Section III-B.5.
Define Etotal as the amount of energy available to a client.
We use the number of queries that can be completed to quantify
the performance of a wireless data access scheme. Mathemati-
cally, client i’s utility is given by,
Ui =
Etotal
EiUL + E
i
DL
(1)
The objective is to reduce the amount of energy consumed in
the query process such that every client’s utility (Equation (1))
is increased, but with bounded query delay.
In a simple data access scheme, whenever a new query ar-
rives, the client is required to send an uplink request to inform
the server, i.e., EUL = Es. Thus, we have,
Ui =
Etotal
Es + EDL
(2)
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Fig. 2. Client 1 chooses not to request at t1 but cannot find da in the 1st
server broadcast. Then, it requests with probability 1 at t2.
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Fig. 3. Client 1 chooses not to request at both t1 and t2 but it cannot find da
in the 1st and 22 server broadcast. Then, it requests with probability 1 at t3.
Due to data locality, some data items are more popular than
the others [3]. It is possible that more than one client indepen-
dently requests for the same “hot” data item. However, these
duplicated requests are a wasteful of (1) battery energy; and (2)
uplink bandwidth. In fact, these requesting clients, but not all,
are more advantageous to “back-off” and let some others send
the request to the server on behalf of themselves. Ideally, only
one request is needed to trigger the server to broadcast the data
item. However, this would require explicit coordination among
clients. Such extra communication overheads may not justify
the energy conserved from uplink requests. More importantly,
the client, who actually sends the request, expends its own bat-
tery energy and possibly bears monetary cost for the goodness
of others. Without appropriate incentives, there is obviously no
client willing to take up the requesting role.
To analyze the above conflicting situation, we model the
data access problem as a static non-cooperative game—WDA
game—each player (client) maximizes its own utility (Equa-
tion (1)) with no explicit communication with one another.
Denote N = {1, . . . , n} as the set of players (clients).
Each player determines its request probability—probability of
sending an uplink request to the server. The strategy space
of player i is given by, Si = {si|0 ≤ si ≤ 1} ⊂ 1.
The strategy combination is denoted as, s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈
S, where S = ×j∈NSj ⊂ n is the Cartesian prod-
uct of the n players’ strategy spaces. Furthermore, define
s−i = (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sn) ∈ S−i, where S−i =
×j∈N\{i}Sj ⊂ n−1, as the strategy combination of all the
players, except i. Ui(s) ∈ 1 represents the utility of player i
when the strategy combination is s. A strategy combination, s∗
is said to achieve Nash equilibrium when:
Ui(s∗) ≥ Ui(s∗−i, si) ∀si ∈ Si, i ∈ N (3)
Notice that the utility function, Ui, depends on each player’s
strategy, si, which in turn affects the strategies of all the other
players, s−i, In other words, a strategy combination is said to
achieve the state of Nash equilibrium when no player can im-
prove its utility by unilaterally deviating from it own strategy.
A salient feature is that there is no coordination among the set
of players. In general, a game may have multiple equilibria or
even none at all.
B. WDA Game—2-person version
To study the WDA game, we start with analyzing the 2-
person version, i.e., N = {1, 2}. There are two clients in the
system, each of which determines its request probability, si,
independently. Consider that case that client 1 chooses not to
request. If client 2 sends a request for the same data item, the
server will make the data item available in the next broadcast
period. As such, the uplink cost, EUL, for client 1 is zero.
Otherwise, the desired data will not appear in the immediate
server’s broadcast. If client 1 is not patient enough to wait for
another period, its strategy is to send the request with probabil-
ity 1, as illustrated in Figure 2. The uplink cost for clients 1 and
2 are, respectively,
E1UL = s1Es + (1− s1)(1− s2)(Es + Ew) (4)
E2UL = s2Es + (1− s1)(1− s2)(Es + Ew) (5)
where Ew is defined as the amount of energy required to wait
for a broadcast period, i.e., Ew represents the “cost of wait-
ing”. It is observed, from Equations (4) and (5), that the utility
Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM’05) 
0-7695-2342-0/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE
functions are symmetrical. This motivates us to search for sym-
metric equilibrium strategies.
Let Ew = αEs and differentiate U1 with respect to s1 gives,
∂U1
∂s1
= − EtotalEs
E1UL + EDL
{s2(1 + α)− α} (6)
Depending on the values of s2,
∂U1
∂s1
takes on different val-
ues:
1) s2 < α1+α ⇒ ∂U1∂s1 > 0
Client 1’s best-reply strategy is, s∗1 = 1, which reduces to
the original simple access scheme.
2) s2 > α1+α ⇒ ∂U1∂s1 < 0
Client 1’s best-reply strategy is, s∗1 = 0, i.e., client 2’s
request probability is large such that client 1 is always
advantageous to wait for a broadcast period.
3) s2 = α1+α ⇒ ∂U1∂s1 = 0
The best-reply for client 1 is any feasible strategy, i.e.,
player 1 is indifferent between request and wait. In par-
ticular, the strategy combination, (s∗1, s
∗
2) = (
α
1+α ,
α
1+α ),
achieves a weak Nash equilibrium.
To avoid the weak equilibrium and the associated degener-
ated solutions, consider the case that client 1 is patient enough
to wait for one extra broadcast period. In other words, client 1
waits for a maximum of two server broadcasts before forcing
to request with probability one (see Figure 3). Thus, the uplink
energy cost becomes:
EUL = Es{s1 + (1− s1)(1− s2)(s1 + α)
+ (1− s1)2(1− s2)2(1 + 2α)} (7)
The best-reply strategy for client 1 is shown to be,
s1 =
2(1 + 2α)(1− s2)2 − (1− α)(1− s2)− 1
2(1 + 2α)(1− s2)2 − 2(1− s2) (8)
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Fig. 4. s1 versus s2.
Figure 4 shows a plot of Equation (8) when α = 0.5. It is
observed that there is only one fixed-point solution within the
feasible strategy space, i.e., s∗1 = s
∗
2 = 0.4131, which is the
unique equilibrium strategy of the game.
C. WDA Game—n-person version
Based on the analysis in Section II-B, the 2-person WDA
game is transformed to the n-person version as follows:
If client i has a query pending for the data item, dx, the equi-
librium strategy, s∗i , is used. Otherwise, si = 0 for that data
item, since client i is not interested in dx. Comparing with
Equation (7), client i’s uplink energy cost for dx is: EiUL =
Es{si +(si +α)
∏
j∈M (1− sj)+ (1+ 2α)
∏
j∈M (1− sj)2},
where M ⊆ N , is the set of clients interested in dx. Thus, the
symmetric equilibrium strategy is given by,
s∗ =
2(1 + 2α)χ2 − (1− α)χ− 1
2(1 + 2α)χ2 − 2χ (9)
where χ = (1− s∗)m−1 with m = |M |.
Theorem 1: There exists an equilibrium strategy for the n-
person WDA game.
Proof: First, each player’s strategy space, Si ∈ 1, is non-
empty, convex and compact. Second, the utility function, Ui ,
are continuous on S, ∀i ∈ N . Furthermore, the best-reply map-
ping is single-valued. By Brouwer’s fixed point theorem [2],
there exists a fixed point solution in the best-reply mapping.
Thus, we can conclude that there exists an equilibrium strategy
for the n-person WDA game (Section 2.2 pp. 14–15, [11]).
Although Theorem 1 does not rule out the possibility of more
than one equilibrium, we observe, from simulations, that the
equilibrium strategy (Equation (9)) appears to be unique.
D. The Protocol
To achieve the stated equilibrium strategy, we design algo-
rithms for server and clients, which are formalized as follows:
Each client executes Algorithm 1 to determine the equilib-
rium strategy. Clients do not solve Equation (8) every time. In-
stead, the solutions are calculated and stored for table lookup.
Each client determines its request probability independently
based on the m value announced by the server (see below).
It should be emphasized that there is no coordination among
clients. If there is more than one query pending, the client plays
with the joint request probability.
Using Algorithm 2, the server keeps track of the set of m
and announces the values to each client via periodic broadcast.
For m = 1, the request probability is 0.4132 (see Section II-B).
If the server intentionally announces m = 0.4668, each client
would play 0.6567, which corresponds to the optimal strategy.
Thus, clients plays with the optimal request probability as if it
is an equilibrium strategy. This requires the server to perform
the actual-to-optimal m mapping. To improve efficiency, the
mapping is also done via table lookup. It is assumed that the
server knows (1) the mean query generation time of a typical
client, e.g., from previous usage statistics; and (2) the number
of alive clients, e.g., from the network layer, from which the
values of m can be estimated.
Server runs Algorithm 3 to reply clients’ queries. In addition
to the data content, the server also broadcasts an index list, sim-
ilar to the one used in [5]. Using the index list, clients can tune
to their desired data item(s) and ignore the others. This further
conserves clients’ energy in monitoring the broadcast channel,
which is also costly [8].
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Algorithm 1 Client—Query
1: for each new query, qi(dj) do
2: Use mj to determine s∗ from Equation (9);
3: s = 1− (1− s)(1− s∗);
4: Q = Q ∪ dj ;
5: Send(s);
6: end for
7: for each server broadcast period, L do
8: if Q 
= ∅ then
9: Check the index list, I;
10: Download the desired data item(s);
11: end if
12: if Q 
= ∅ then
13: if a query has missed two server broadcast then
14: s = 1;
15: end if
16: Send(s);
17: end if
18: end for
19: Function Send(s)
20: if rand < s then
21: Send a request;
22: Q = ∅; s = 0;
23: end if
Algorithm 2 Server—m-values
1: for j = 1 to |D| do
2: m′j = pj(θ)
∑
i∈N ′
L
T iq
;
3: m′j → mj , using actual-to-optimal m table;
4: end for
III. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We evaluate our proposed game theoretic power aware wire-
less data access scheme using MATLAB simulation.
A. Simulation Model and Parameters
Table I shows the values of major simulation parameters.
Most of the parameter values are the same as in [5], [17]. Each
client generates a stream of exponentially distributed queries
with mean query arrival time, Tq , drawn uniformly between
Tminq and T
max
q , which models different levels of interest on
1For illustration purposes, the energy available, Etotal, is set to 100J . In
fact, different values would only change the scale of the performance graphs
(see also Section III-B.6).
Algorithm 3 Server—Reply
1: for each received query qi(dx) do
2: I = I ∪ dx;
3: end for
4: for each server broadcast period, L do
5: Broadcast I;
6: Broadcast the content of data items in I;
7: end for
TABLE I
SIMULATION PARAMETERS.
Parameter Value
Database size (|D|) 1,000
Data item size 1KB–10KB
Broadcast interval (L) 20s
Client population size (|N |) 200
Transmit power 0.5W
Receive power 0.1W
Relative cost of waiting (α) 0.5
Bandwidth 144Kbps
Energy available1(Etotal) 100J
Minimum query arrival rate (Tminq ) 5s
Maximum query arrival rate (Tmaxq ) 50s
Uplink request size 1KB
the database among the set of clients. We use the Zipf-like dis-
tribution [8], with θ = 0.9, to model the non-uniform access
pattern. Each client queries the jth data item with probabil-
ity given by: pj(θ) = 1/{jθ
∑|D|
k=1
1
kθ
}, where 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1.
The value of θ determines the “skewness” of the access pattern.
θ = 1 gives the strict Zipf distribution while θ = 0 results in the
uniform distribution. To focus on the data access process, the
effect of client caching is not considered. Thus, clients do not
need to expend energy to obtain and process any consistency
information. The server replies clients’ queries every L sec-
onds and announces m-values whenever the set of alive client
changes. It is assumed that both the uplink and downlink band-
width are used exclusively for data access.
B. Simulation Results
We compare the performance of the WDA game with that of
a simple access scheme in terms of (1) utility; (2) lifetime; (3)
amount of uplink traffic; and (4) average query delay. We also
study the effect of client population size, |N |, on the above four
metrics.
1) Utility (number of completed queries): Figure 5(a) shows
the number of queries completed (utility) versus the ith client.
Notice that client indices are in ascending order of their mean
query arrival time, i.e., the 1st client has the highest query rate.
First, we observe that every client’s utility is increased in the
WDA game compared to the simple access scheme. This is be-
cause each client individually and independently optimizes its
utility function (Equation (1)) to determine its equilibrium re-
quest probability. If a client chooses not to request, the client
expends energy to wait for server’s reply. Although the reply
may not appear, the analysis shows that the decision would be
advantageous in terms of expectation. This is confirmed by the
simulation results. Second, clients with higher utility values
show larger improvements, since they benefit more due to their
frequent queries. On the other hand, low-utility clients dissi-
pate the majority of their energy in idle state and do not show
significant improvement in utility.
2) Lifetime: The lifetime of each client is shown in Fig-
ure 5(b). The lifetime of a client is defined as the time taken to
Proceedings of the Sixth IEEE International Symposium on a World of Wireless Mobile and Multimedia Networks (WoWMoM’05) 
0-7695-2342-0/05 $20.00 © 2005 IEEE
 3500
 4000
 4500
 5000
 5500
 6000
 6500
 7000
 20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180  200
Ut
ilit
y
ith client
WDA game
simple access
(a) Utility versus ith client.
 40000
 60000
 80000
 100000
 120000
 140000
 160000
 180000
 20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180  200
Li
fe
tim
e/
s
ith client
WDA game
simple access
(b) Lifetime versus ith client.
 3000
 3500
 4000
 4500
 5000
 5500
 6000
 20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180  200
N
um
be
r o
f r
eq
ue
st
s 
se
nt
ith client
WDA game
simple access
(c) Number of requests sent versus ith client.
 10
 11
 12
 13
 14
 15
 20  40  60  80  100  120  140  160  180  200
Av
er
ag
e 
qu
er
y 
de
la
y/
s
ith client
WDA game
simple access
(d) Average query delay versus ith client.
Fig. 5. Performance of the WDA game in different metrics.
deplete its available energy, Etotal. First, the lifetime of every
client is increased in theWDA game compared to the simple ac-
cess scheme. Second, we observe that high-utility clients have
relatively shorter lifetimes. This is because of their high query
arrival rates: energy dissipates more rapidly in sending requests
to the server. As such, they deplete their energy source earlier.
Third, low-utility clients achieve larger improvements in life-
time compared to the high-utility ones. It is because the energy
conserved from uplink requests has a more significant effect in
the low-utility group, which is mainly in the idle state with low
power consumption.
3) Uplink Traffic (number of uplink requests sent): Fig-
ure 5(c) shows the number of requests sent for the ith client.
We observe a similar result: each client sends fewer requests
to the server. This provides an explanation for the increase
in lifetime of every client. Unlike the previous two metrics,
each client shows a very similar reduction in the number of re-
quests sent. This is due to the common access pattern, i.e., the
Zipf − like distribution, used in the simulation model. The
result also suggests that similar amount of energy is conserved
among the clients. As such, all clients benefit from playing the
game. Besides the energy conservation effect, fewer requests
sent also reduces: (1) uplink bandwidth requirement; (2) colli-
sion probability; and (3) interference to other users.
4) Query Delay: The performance improvements come
with a cost: increase in average query delay, which is defined as
the time between arrival of a query and complete reception of
the reply from the server. Figure 5(d) shows the clients’ aver-
age query delay in the WDA game and a simple access scheme.
As expected, clients playing theWDA game experience slightly
longer average query delay. This is inherently in the design of
the game: wait for some one to make the request. However,
the delay is bounded by the additional requirement: if the de-
sired data item does not appear in the immediately two server’s
broadcast, the client is forced to send a request with probabil-
ity one. Indeed, if a client can tolerate a larger worst-case de-
lay or energy conservation becomes very significant (e.g., in
low-energy state), it is possible to revise the requirement—say,
check three server’s broadcast before forcing to request.
5) Effect of Channel Fluctuations: We have assumed that
the energy cost of sending a query request, Es, is fixed. In
this section, we would like to investigate the effect of channel
fluctuations, i.e., variable Es, on various performance metrics.
We adopted a simple two-state first-order Markov chain de-
scribed in [6] to model the channel fluctuations. Specifically,
the channel state is either good or bad. The transition prob-
ability matrix, Mc, is given by [6]: Mc =
[
p 1− p
1− q q
]
,
where p and 1− q are the probabilities that the channel state is
good in the current timeslot, given that the channel state in the
previous timeslot was good or bad, respectively. Both p and q
depend on (1) fading margin, F ; (2) timeslot duration, T ; and
(3) Doppler bandwidth fD = V/λ, where V is the maximum
mobile speed and λ is the carrier wavelength.
Consider a network model [14], [15] with carrier frequency,
fc = 1800MHz; V = 50km/hr; and T = 2.5ms, the transition
probabilities are given by, (p, q) = (0.9100, 0.1446) for F =
10dB; (p, q) = (0.7665, 0.3722) for F = 5dB. The transmit
power is set to 0.5W and 1.0W when the channel is good or
bad, respectively.
Figure 6 shows the performance of the WDA game in dif-
ferent channel conditions. F = ∞ corresponds to the results
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Fig. 6. Effect of channel fluctuations on the WDA game (F =∞, 10dB, 5dB,
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in previous sections, i.e. the channel is always good. On the
other hand, F = 0 represents the worst-case scenario, i.e., the
channel is always bad.
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Fig. 7. Effect of initial energy, Etotal.
6) Effect of Initial Energy Distribution: Figure 7 shows the
effect of initial energy distribution in terms of normalized util-
ity. There are 200 clients with Tq = 25s and Etotal evenly
distributed between 100J and 1, 000J. The performance is mea-
sured in terms of normalized utility, which is defined as utility
per Joule of energy. From the figure, it is observed that clients
with a smaller Etotal achieved a slightly larger normalized util-
ity. This suggests that the WDA game is more efficient for low-
energy clients, which is a desirable property. Similar results
were observed in terms of lifetime (not shown [16]).
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We studied the following wireless data access scenario: a
number of clients send query requests to a server to query for a
set of data items; the server replies with the requested content
via the common broadcast channel. We designed a utility func-
tion (Equation (1)), which takes power consumption in trans-
mit, receive and idle modes, into consideration. Based on this
power aware utility function, we formulated our power aware
wireless data access scheme as a non-cooperative game—WDA
game. We have shown that clients are not always necessary to
send query requests to the server. Instead, each client deter-
mines its equilibrium request probability without any explicit
communication with one another. We also formalized and eval-
uated the algorithms for the server and clients in the WDA
game. Simulation results confirmed that our proposed power
aware wireless data access scheme, comparing with a simple
always-request one, increases the utility and lifetime of every
client while reducing the number of requests sent, at the cost of
a slightly larger average query delay.
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